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Forfeiture and Restitution in the Federal Criminal System:
The Conflict of Victims’ Rights and Government Interests
BY: SCOTT JONES
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n recent years, Congress has expressed increasing concern for victims of crime. In 2004 it passed the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”),1 which grants victims
certain rights during the prosecution of their victimizer,
including the right to consult with the government before plea
agreements are entered and the right to be heard in court before
sentence is imposed. It has also required, through enactment
of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”),2 that
courts impose an obligation to pay restitution to victims as part
of criminal sentences.
That mandate, however, was not accompanied by any
modification to existing criminal forfeiture law,3 the statutory
framework under which the government takes title to the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.4 There is no single, coherent statute or rule that governs these two
processes. Furthermore, Congress has not
acknowledged the reality that both forfeiture and restitution draw from the same
limited source: the financial and property
resources of the defendant. As a result,
federal law now grants both the government and the victim a right to the same
limited pool of assets.
In the absence of guidance from Congress, courts construe the conflict between
the mandatory forfeiture and restitution provisions as rendering
them powerless to order the government to turn forfeited assets
over to victims. Since forfeiture normally begins before restitution is ordered, the government can have complete control over
whether the victim receives restitution. The law thereby allows
the victim to be twice victimized—first by the offender who
deprives him of his property by theft, fraud, or embezzlement,
then by the government which uses the criminal justice system
to prevent the return of stolen property.
This outcome should be corrected as it is contrary to congressional intent, fundamental concepts of fairness, and the
overall goals of criminal sentencing. Although all three branches
of government could affect the relative prioritization of forfeiture and restitution, only Congress can completely remedy the
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problem. Congress should therefore enact a few relatively minor
statutory modifications to better align the forfeiture and restitution systems with the ideals of American justice.

II. THE HISTORY, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF FEDERAL
FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION
A. ORIGINS OF RESTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
FORFEITURE
Modern restitution and forfeiture are both rooted in the
earliest era of the rule of law.5 These principles arose when
criminal law was indistinct from the law of tort, and stem from
the belief that offenders owe two duties—compensation to their
victims and payment to the sovereign for its role in administering justice6 —as well as from a desire
to ensure that criminals do not profit from
their crimes.7
As criminal law became distinct from
civil law, the two punishment theories
diverged. Although judges occasionally
ordered offenders to compensate their
victims for the effects of their crimes, the
formal duty to do so was relegated to the
civil law.8 The idea that offenders should
be sentenced to pay a fine to the sovereign,
meanwhile, became a core assumption of criminal sentencing.
Methods by which courts could impose payment obligations became somewhat complex—the state eventually was given (or
rather, created for itself) additional methods to draw monetary
and other assets from offenders, including forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of their crime.9

B. THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
In the past few decades, restitution has made something
of a return from its exile in tort law, largely as an expression
of congressional concern for crime victims. In 1996, Congress
enacted the MVRA,10 which requires courts to order restitution
when imposing a sentence for, inter alia, any “offense against
property, including any offense committed by fraud and deceit
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. . . in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a
physical injury or pecuniary loss.”11
The legislative history of the MVRA suggests that Congress
intended to reform the criminal justice system to prioritize the
needs of crime victims.12 It also suggests that Congress wanted
to make it easier for victims to obtain restitution by making it
a penalty separate from civil remedies and by preventing its
administration from taking on the procedural complications of
civil suits.13
It is worth emphasizing that the MVRA made restitution
mandatory: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when
sentencing a defendant convicted of [a crime of violence, property crime, including fraud, or tampering with consumer products], the court shall order, in addition to . . . any other penalty
authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the
victim of the offense.”14 The court is required to order restitution “in the full amount of each victim’s losses,”15 and cannot
consider the economic circumstances of the defendant.16
Congress recently reaffirmed its desire to improve the
criminal justice system’s treatment of victims and to ensure the
payment of restitution with the 2004 enactment of the CVRA.17
The CVRA provides, in pertinent part, that “a crime victim has
. . . the right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding .
. . involving . . . sentencing; the reasonable right to confer with
the attorney for the Government in the case; . . . the right to
proceedings free from unreasonable delay . . . [and] the right to
full and timely restitution as provided in law.”18

C. THE LAW OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
Criminal forfeiture statutes are scattered throughout the
federal criminal code. Forfeiture provisions are written into a
number of individual statutes, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act19 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) Act,20 and are to some
extent consolidated in 21 U.S.C. § 85321 and 18 U.S.C. § 982.22
For purposes of simplification, the discussion here will focus on
criminal forfeiture of the instrumentalities and proceeds of fraud
and other property crimes as governed by § 982.
Section 982 is something of a catchall provision, which
mandates23 forfeiture of any assets involved in, and/or the proceeds of, a large number of predicate offenses.24 Notably included in that list are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957,25 the two
federal money laundering provisions. Since committing a property crime or fraud will almost inevitably lead to conducting
transactions with the proceeds, § 982 makes criminal forfeiture available in prosecutions for almost any property crime or
fraud—the same set of offenses for which the MVRA requires
restitution.
Regardless of the offense of conviction, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32.2 controls the manner in which a court
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forfeits the asset in question to the government.26 The Rule was
adopted in 2000 in an attempt to unify and codify the procedural
requirements of criminal forfeiture.27 There is no indication in
Rule 32.2 that the interests of victims should be taken into account by the court during the forfeiture process; the statute, in
fact, makes no reference to restitution.
Rule 32.2 contains a number of procedural protections for
the defendant, including the requirement that a charging document notify the defendant that the government intends to seek
forfeiture.28 It also requires that the government prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence,29 that a nexus exists between
the offense and the property to be forfeited—that the assets in
question are proceeds or instrumentalities of the underlying
crime.30 The court31 makes the nexus determination only after
the defendant has been found guilty or has a guilty or nolo contendere plea accepted by the court.32 If the court finds a nexus,
Rule 32.2(b)(2) requires that the government enter a preliminary
order for the forfeiture of specific property or a specific amount
of money. The court is required to issue the order “without regard to any third party’s interest in all or part” of the assets to
be forfeited.33
After entering the preliminary order of forfeiture, the court
may hold an ancillary hearing to determine (1) if the defendant
truly has an interest in the property; and (2) whether any third
parties have claims to the property.34 No ancillary hearing is
held in cases of monetary forfeiture, since a monetary judgment
is regarded as an in personam judgment that does not implicate
any third-party interests.35 Ancillary hearings are not part of
sentencing, and function similarly to a standard civil proceeding
where third party claims may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim or lack of standing.36 These two provisions of the Rule
effectively render victims of fraud unable to assert claims in ancillary forfeiture proceedings. In cases in which the victim has
lost monetary assets, there is no ancillary hearing at which they
could raise a claim. In cases of real property loss, the victims are
considered to have no standing, because “third-party interests”
are limited to ownership interests and fraudsters obtain title
when victims transfer their assets to them.37 At the conclusion
of the ancillary hearing, the court can amend the preliminary
order of forfeiture to reflect the interests of third parties and its
determination of the defendant’s interests in the property.

D. FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION IN PRACTICE
The everyday practices of forfeiture and restitution are
greatly affected by the fact that the vast majority of federal
prosecutions result in guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements.38
This gives the government an advantage over crime victims in
obtaining the assets of the offender.
The process of forfeiture normally begins before restitution is even considered, because the government can seize the
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assets at issue before trial by requesting that the court enter a
protective order of restraint.39 Furthermore, forfeiture “relates
back” to the time of the offense, so that when the final order of
forfeiture is entered, courts apply the legal fiction that title to
the property transferred to the government when the crime was
committed.40 These constructions give the government, at least
to some degree,41 possession of the assets before the court enters
an order of restitution—a distinct advantage in any later dispute
with the victim over the assets.
Unlike the jury determination of assets to be forfeited, the
court determines the amount of restitution, normally on the
basis of a pre-sentence report prepared by a Probation Officer.42
That portion of the typical pre-sentence report is based on either
the evidence presented to the jury or the facts stipulated in the
plea agreement. However, the Probation
Officer preparing the report will normally review evidence submitted by any
victim who contests the loss amount.43
Since most prosecutions end in
guilty pleas, decisions made by Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) in plea
agreements usually control the outcome
of property involved in each case. The
parties typically stipulate to a restitution amount in the plea agreement,44 a
norm that at least raises the possibility
that the government will negotiate away
some of the victim’s right to repayment
in exchange for consideration it finds
more valuable. Because of the court’s
reliance on Probation Officers and their
use of plea agreements as a basis for the
determination of loss, AUSAs can effectively set the amount of restitution
that a victim will receive. AUSAs also
have the theoretical ability to deviate
from Department of Justice (“the Department”) restitution and
forfeiture policy—since plea negotiations occur before entry of
a final forfeiture order, they do not implicate Department directives. The AUSA prosecuting the case can therefore effectively
agree to transfer restrained assets to the victim to satisfy the
forthcoming restitution order without the involvement of the
Department hierarchy.

III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FORFEITURE AND
MANDATORY RESTITUTION
A. CONGRESS HAS CREATED INCENTIVES FOR THE
GOVERNMENT TO KEEP FORFEITED FUNDS RATHER
THAN REMIT THEM TO CRIME VICTIMS
Under the provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 (“CCA”),45 forfeited assets are collected into the
Assets Forfeiture Fund (“the Fund”), an account controlled by
the Department. The Fund is used to “pay the costs associated
with . . . forfeitures, including the costs of managing and disposing of property, satisfying . . . innocent owner claims,46 and . . .
accomplishing the legal forfeiture of the
property [as well as] financ[ing] certain
general investigative expenses.”47 Those
general investigative expenses include
“joint law enforcement operations,”48
meaning the Department can use forfeited assets to pay state and local law
enforcement agencies for their participation in federal operations, including
participation in operations that have
no connection to any forfeiture. Under
the CCA, the Department can pay any
amount for “overtime salaries, travel,
fuel, training, equipment, and other similar costs of State or local law enforcement officers that are incurred in a joint
law enforcement operation with a Federal law enforcement agency participating in the Fund.”49 The Department can
therefore use forfeited assets to fund an
entire operation with no connection to a
crime resulting in forfeiture, like a joint
anti-terrorism task force, as long as the
operation involves at least one federal agent.
Furthermore, many of those expenditures, like training
and equipping personnel, are not consumable—rather than be
exhausted in the course of the joint operation, they eventually
benefit the state or local law enforcement agency involved. Retaining forfeited funds thereby enables the Department to semifederalize state law enforcement. At the very least, it allows the
Department to subsidize agencies that align their priorities with
those of the federal government.

Since most

prosecutions end in

guilty pleas, decisions

made by Assistant U.S.
Attorneys (“AUSAs”)
in plea agreements
usually control the

outcome of property

involved in each case.
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In short, the CCA creates incentives for the Department
to retain forfeited assets by transforming them into a source
of non-appropriated funding, which is a powerful lure for the
leadership of any federal agency.

B. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SEEMS TO BE
RESPONDING TO THOSE INCENTIVES IN A WAY THAT
PREVENTS VICTIMS FROM OBTAINING ALL THE
RESTITUTION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED
There is evidence that the incentives created by the CCA
are affecting the Department’s remission decisions, in that the
government does not always put the interests of victims ahead
of its own pecuniary interests. One example is the alleged conduct of the government in Adams v. United States Department
of Justice Asset Forfeiture Division,50 in which the plaintiffs
claimed that forfeited funds that should have been turned over
to them were instead given to local law enforcement agencies
for their assistance in the investigation of a fraud.51 The suit was
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds before discovery, but there
is no indication in the decision that the government denied possession of funds forfeited from the criminal defendant.52
Although it was decided before passage of the CVRA and
the MVRA and involved a civil forfeiture action, United States
v. Chan53 is a similar example of the government prioritizing its
interests above those of the victim. There, prior to the entry of
a plea agreement with a defendant charged with bank fraud, an
AUSA met with the president of the bank, asked him not file
a civil suit against the defendant, and told him that the bank
would be the recipient of funds forfeited to the government.54
The plea agreement eventually entered was consistent with that
understanding, and provided that the forfeited assets be credited
towards the defendant’s restitution obligation.55 Yet after the
court accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment requiring restitution, the Department did not volunteer any funds
to the victim and eventually affirmatively denied the bank’s petition for remission.56 In an order granting the bank’s motion
to enforce the terms of the plea agreement,57 the district court
ordered the Department to remit the forfeited funds as agreed,
along with attorney’s fees and costs, and described the conduct
of the Department as “outrageous and an embarrassment to the
United States.”58
In other cases, the Department has refused to allow forfeited assets to be credited towards defendants’ restitution obligation.59 Victims are entitled to restitution in an amount equal
to, but no greater than, their loss.60 In making that refusal, the
government effectively requires victims to file remission petitions before getting stolen assets back, at least in cases where
the defendant’s total assets are less than the sum of the forfeiture
and the ordered restitution.
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Department statistics obtained by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) further suggests that the government sometimes puts its interests ahead of those of victims. In
2001, the GAO reported that:
Proceeds from forfeiture are typically used to make
owners (e.g., a mortgager) whole and to fund law
enforcement activities, and are not necessarily used
to fulfill restitution orders. Therefore, the use of forfeiture, as we reported in June 1994, could decrease
amounts that might otherwise be available for paying
restitution to crime victims and reducing outstanding
criminal debt. According to Justice statistics, of the
estimated $536 million of forfeited cash and property
recovered during fiscal year 1999, approximately $39
million (or 7 percent) was applied to restitution in
victim-related offenses. The remaining amounts were
either converted to cash and used for law enforcement
purposes or retained for official law enforcement use.61
Reality may not be as grim as the GAO suggests—not all of the
seizures included in the Department’s statistics were related to
cases in which restitution was ordered62—but even if the numbers cited misstate the frequency with which the Department
fails to remit forfeited funds to victims by a factor of ten, the
report still indicates a problem.

C. FAILURE TO REMIT FORFEITED FUNDS APPEARS
TO BE MORE THAN A SERIES OF ISOLATED DECISIONS
MADE BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
The policies, procedures, and bureaucratic inefficiencies of
the Department seem to be responsible for much of the failure to
remit forfeited funds. The policy of the Department is that “[t]
he disposition of property forfeited to the United States is an
executive branch decision and not a matter for the court.”63 The
Department therefore requires that its attorneys draft forfeiture
orders “broadly, [in order] to direct forfeiture of the property to
the United States ‘for disposition in accordance with law’.”64
Use of the phrase “in accordance with law” preserves unfettered government discretion over remission. If the phrase were
replaced with “for disposition in the interests of justice” or “for
disposition that would provide victims with restitution in accordance with the MVRA and the CVRA,” there would at least be
internal pressure on Department actors to remit forfeited property to victims.
The Department also states that its asset forfeiture program
has three main goals:
(1) to punish and deter criminal activity by depriving criminals of property used or acquired through
illegal activities; (2) to enhance cooperation among
foreign, federal, state and local law enforcement agenSpring 2011

cies through the equitable sharing of assets recovered
. . . (3) to produce revenues to enhance forfeitures and
strengthen law enforcement.65
Those goals take full advantage of the CCA, and seem to embrace the incentives this statute creates for denying petitions for
remission. The list does not include “furthering the interests of
victims” or “ensuring that victims of crime are made whole.”
The procedure by which the Department considers petitions
for remission may also increase the institutional reluctance to
turn forfeited assets over to victims. Rather than place the decision to remit with the U.S. Attorney’s Office responsible for the
case, the Attorney General has delegated his authority to grant
petitions for remission of forfeited property to the Chief of the
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Criminal Division (“Asset Forfeiture Chief”).66 The Asset Forfeiture
Chief may use that authority to “restore forfeited property to
victims or take other actions to protect the rights of innocent
persons in civil or criminal forfeitures that are in the interest of
justice and that are not inconsistent with the provisions of the
statute.”67
It is important to note that the language quoted above is
permissive rather than compulsive, and imposes no obligation
on the Department to ensure that victims are made whole. Department policy also imposes restrictions on the Asset Forfeiture Chief’s discretion, only allowing remission petitions to be
granted when the involved U.S. Attorney certifies in writing
that:
(1) All known victims have been properly notified of
the restitution proceedings and are properly accounted
for in the restitution order; (2) To the best of knowledge and belief after consultation with the seizing
agency, the losses described in the restitution order
have been verified and reflect all sources of compensation received by the victims, including returns on
investments, interest payments, insurance proceeds,
refunds, settlement payments, lawsuit awards, and any
other sources of compensation for their losses; (3) To
the best of knowledge and belief after consultation with
the seizing agency, reasonable efforts to locate additional assets establish that the victims do not have recourse reasonably available to other assets from which
to obtain compensation for their losses, including,
other assets owned or controlled by the defendant(s);
and (4) There is no evidence to suggest that any of the
victims knowingly contributed to, participated in, benefitted [sic] from, or acted in a willfully blind manner
toward the commission of the offenses underlying the
forfeiture, or related offenses.68
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The default, then, is to keep the money for the Department’s
use. Furthermore, by taking the decision to grant remission
away from the prosecuting AUSA, the Department has removed
it from the person most knowledgeable about the victim’s financial status and the overall equities of the remission decision.
A 2005 GAO investigation showed that bureaucratic inefficiencies can also be responsible for failure to give forfeited
funds to victims, even when the Department has decided to
remit.69 The GAO’s report examined five high-dollar-value
fraud cases, and found in one that the Department’s records
demonstrated the forfeiture of $125 million less than the court’s
documents.70 The GAO also found that the Department’s unit
responsible for ensuring payment of restitution “was not certain whether any forfeited assets had been, or could be, applied
toward the offender’s restitution debt.”71 If, as the GAO report
suggests, the government does not have appropriate accounting
measures for tracking payment and remission of forfeiture, victims should doubt its ability to ensure that they are made whole.

D. COURTS HAVE CONSTRUED THE MVRA AND THE
CVRA AS NOT LIMITING GOVERNMENT DISCRETION
Before passage of the CVRA and MVRA, victims without
title to the property forfeited to the government were not entitled to judicial relief, and instead had to petition the Attorney
General for a discretionary remission of forfeiture.72 Strangely,
enactment of the two statutes has had no effect on that reality.
The MVRA may actually encourage the government to retain seized assets. In the pre-MVRA era, restitution orders could
be offset by the value of property seized by the government.73
The possibility of such a credit gave the victim something of a
proprietary interest in the forfeited property (or at least could
make the victim feel that he had one), thereby increasing pressure on the government to remit the assets.
After passage of the MVRA, however, the court must order
restitution in the amount of the victim’s loss regardless of any
compensation from insurance or other sources, other than “any
amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same
loss by the victim in—(A) any Federal civil proceeding; and
(B) any State civil proceeding, to the extent provided by the
law of the State.”74 The Fourth Circuit held in United States
v. Alalade75 that the potential for forfeited assets to be remitted to the victim should not be considered in determining the
amount of restitution due.76 Other courts considering this issue
have followed the Alalade rule, and have only credited restitution obligations by the value of forfeited assets when the government voluntarily remits that property to the victim before
sentencing.77
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In the post-MVRA world, then, the Department may believe that turning over forfeited assets to the victim makes it
possible for the victim to double-collect. However, over-compensation would only be possible if the offender had enough
assets left after the forfeiture to pay the ordered amount of restitution. Since offenders’ assets are normally consumed by the
forfeiture,78 this is a poor foundation for a policy of retaining
forfeited property.
The only published opinion addressing the effects of the
CVRA on forfeiture held that the statute did not grant courts
the power to order forfeited funds be remitted to victims. That
decision, from United States v. Rubin,79 contains pretty clear
language: “[R]ecognizing that the CVRA only mandates restitution as provided by law, the Court notes that no law transforms
forfeiture into a pool for restitution .
. . Bluntly and simply, forfeiture and
restitution are parallel, and therefore
separate, processes.”80 A footnote
from the case is directly on point:
“Congress did not compel that the
forfeiture pool must be applied first to
restitution or that restitution have first
call on a defendant’s assets, either in
the CVRA or elsewhere.”81 Partly on
the basis of that analysis, the Rubin
court went on to hold that the government fulfilled its CVRA and MVRA
obligations merely by consulting the
victim regarding the victim’s losses
and desire for restitution.82
The Fourth Circuit has suggested
that it would accept the Rubin court’s
analysis. Dicta in the unpublished In
re Doe83 decision address the government’s obligations under the CVRA
and notes:

IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION
A. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO ENSURE THAT
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE DOES NOT PREVENT VICTIMS
FROM RECEIVING THE RESTITUTION TO WHICH THEY
ARE ENTITLED
The law should be changed to prioritize restitution over forfeiture. Doing so would ensure that congressional intent regarding victims’ rights is realized, further the interests of justice, and
promote rehabilitation of the offender. Although the Judiciary
and the Executive can act to minimize the current problem, the
best approach is for Congress to modify the relevant statutes.

i. Congressional Intent

The law should be

changed to prioritize

restitution over forfeiture.
Doing so would ensure

that congressional intent
regarding victims’ rights

The current state of the law does
not reflect Congressional intent, as
there is no evidence that Congress
intended for forfeiture to the government to be prioritized over restitution
to the victim. Instead, Congress has
repeatedly expressed the view that
victim restitution should be a priority
of criminal sentencing.86

ii. Interests of Justice

Ensuring that victims are fully
compensated for their loss, even at
a cost to the government, fits within
our conception of justice. Americans
generally believe that individual interests should prevail unless they are
substantially outweighed by government interests. Courts have translated
that belief into a test for the constitutionality of statutes that infringe
upon individual rights.87 If restitution
is truly a “right,” as the title of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
suggests, it would make sense that the traditional rights balancing test would apply.
In this case, the interests of the victim in obtaining restitution outweigh those of the government in retaining forfeited
assets. Beyond the obvious pecuniary stakes, the victim has an
interest that the government does not, as victims are uniquely
harmed by crime and the attention of the justice system should
thus focus on making them whole. Being made whole financially (and perhaps by the attention of the system, emotionally)
provides victims with a sense of closure and relief. Moreover,
consistent payment of restitution also provides victims with an
incentive to report the crimes they otherwise would have ig-

is realized, further the

interests of justice, and
promote rehabilitation
of the offender.

[A]lthough the CVRA provides
the vehicle for Petitioner to assert her right to restitution, it does not create an independent obligation for a district court to order or a
defendant to pay such an award. Rather, the CVRA
merely protects the right to receive restitution that is
provided for elsewhere.84
The only other case that seems to address the effect of the
CVRA on forfeiture is United States v. Zaranek, where in the
context of a wage garnishment order the court deferred to the
Department, noting, “[t]he government has the sole discretion
to decide if forfeited assets will be used to pay a restitution
obligation.” 85
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nored,88 thereby furthering the government’s interest in reducing crime.
By comparison, the interests of the government in retaining
forfeited assets are minimal. The primary goals of criminal forfeiture (ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes
and deterring crime) are met by restitution. The only interest the
government has in forfeiture that is not satisfied by mandatory
restitution is pecuniary. That interest is not, under our ethos,
compelling—a fact that has been recognized by philosophers
such as Sir Thomas More,89 practicing attorneys,90 and foreign
governments,.91

iii. Promoting Rehabilitation of the Offender
Prioritizing restitution over forfeiture also promotes rehabilitation, one of the main goals of criminal punishment.92 The
legislative history of the MVRA conveys Congress’ belief that
restitution could “ensure that the offender realizes the damage
caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as
well as to society.”93 The National Institute of Justice suggests
that “the very act of making restitution can be rehabilitative as
well as punitive, since the offender is forced to confront and
make reparations for the harm caused by his actions.”94 Others have theorized that restitution rehabilitates because it presents the harm caused by the offender to him in the form of an
“identifiable human being,” an effect that forfeiture of assets to
the government lacks.95 In sum, forcing an offender to pay his
victim directly may also force him to think about his crime—
precisely the type of “penitent reflection” that early punishment
theorists believed would aid in rehabilitation.
Restitution may have rehabilitative effects beyond those
caused by confrontation. Proponents of restorative justice, a
system that balances criminal punishment with making victims
whole, argue that restitution “build[s] on offenders’ abilities and
good qualities, increase[s] their accountability and, potentially,
their understanding, and allow[s] them to earn reacceptance in
the community.”96 Punishment theorist Gilbert Geis proposed
that restitution could “produce in the offender a feeling of having been cleansed, a kind of redemptive purging process which
inhibits subsequent wrongdoing.”97
If the above theories are correct, and it is in the offender’s
interest to be rehabilitated, then even he has an interest in the
identity of the recipient of his assets. At the very least, society
has an interest—if rehabilitation is a just outcome, then justice
is better served by providing the assets to the victim.

B. HOW TO PRIORITIZE RESTITUTION OVER
FORFEITURE
Changing the law to provide for the payment of restitution
with forfeited assets could be accomplished by any of the actors
in the system. The Executive could modify Department policy,
the Judiciary could construe existing law differently, or ConCriminal Law Brief

gress could modify the existing statutes. Because of the reach
of congressional power, action by that branch of government
would be the most effective solution.
The Executive could act on its own, without statutory
change. The Department could, as a matter of policy, mandate
transfer of forfeited assets to the victim anytime that forfeiture
renders a defendant unable to comply with an order of restitution. Such a policy change could be adopted quickly, with no
likely congressional objection and with no requirement of congressional action. There are, however, several disadvantages to
the approach. Because assets would be funneled through the
government, none of the rehabilitative benefits of restitution
would likely occur. Furthermore, unilateral Executive action
would leave the government with no recourse to recoup from
the defendant forfeited assets transferred to the victim. The offender could therefore benefit.
Alternatively, courts could construe the MVRA and/or the
CVRA as requiring that restitution be prioritized over forfeiture and begin ordering the government to pass forfeited assets
on to victims. Like Executive action, no congressional action
would be required here. Such a construction would be more
consistent with the congressional intent behind the MVRA and
CVRA than the cases described above. Since the MVRA and
the CVRA are so new (the discussion above details every relevant decision thus far), and as there are no published appellate
court decisions regarding the interaction of criminal forfeiture
with the CVRA and MVRA, a change in their construction
would raise few stare decisis concerns.
A judicial shift in interpretation of the MVRA and CVRA
would, however, not be quick. It would likely take awhile for
circuit courts to articulate the law, during which time victims
would be deprived of restitution. It might also be difficult to
achieve a circuit consensus—the logic of the Rubin and Doe
courts is not entirely unpersuasive. Any disagreement between
the circuits might be enduring, since there would be little to attract the attention of the Supreme Court other than the split itself
given that no constitutional issue is raised and the conflict cannot fairly be described as a matter of great national importance.
The best way to ensure that the restitutionary rights of victims are prioritized over the pecuniary interests of government
would be for Congress to make minor modifications to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The first required change
would be the addition to the Rule of language such as: “In the
event that forfeiture of property to the government has reduced
or eliminated the defendant’s ability to make restitution, the
court shall order that the government transfer forfeited property to the victim. This transfer shall be limited to an amount
required to fulfill the defendant’s restitutionary obligation.”
Those two sentences would fix the problem of prioritization.
To prevent the offender from benefiting from the transfer
of assets from government to victim, Congress should also alter
33

the Rule to give the government either a lien on the defendant’s
future earnings equal to the amount it gave to the victim, or
provide for automatic forfeiture of those earnings. The second
option would be more efficient, since the government would not
have to pursue a civil claim against the defendant—litigation
that would be pointless, since all relevant facts would have been
proved in the criminal proceeding.
The first proposed addition to the Rule is similar to those
made by David Fried and David B. Smith. Almost two decades
ago, prior to the passage of the CVRA and MVRA, Fried proposed replacing the Asset Forfeiture Fund, which he believed
perverted the incentives of prosecution, with a system in which
“[a]ll sums collected from the offender, whether as fines or
forfeitures . . . be allocated in accordance with a scheme of
priorities”98 in which victims were prioritized above the government.99 Fried also suggested that victims retain their right
to civil remedies against the offender to receive compensation
for all their losses, less sums passed on to them from forfeited
assets.100
In 2008, David B. Smith, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
House Judiciary Committee, suggested that Congress could
“provide that all property forfeited under federal law be deposited in the Victims Fund. That would . . . take away the undue
pecuniary incentive that law enforcement now has to…[seek]
forfeitures that are unjust or excessive. Congress could also
make it clear that restitution takes priority over forfeitures.”101
Neither Fried nor Smith, however, provided for a mechanism for the government to recoup the funds passed on to the
victim, even if the defendant was later able to repay them. That
is at least a theoretical flaw. Although convicts would likely be
able to pay the funds back in rare circumstances, reformation of
the law should not reduce the likelihood of eventual payment of
both restitution and forfeiture obligations.
Congressional addition of those two provisions to the Rule
would fix the underlying problem. Furthermore, since all judges
ordering forfeiture have to consider and comply with Rule 32.2,
modifying it rather than the MVRA, the CVRA, or all of the
numerous criminal forfeiture statutes, would ensure that congressional intent was clear that restitution took priority over
forfeiture.
There are, of course, disadvantages. The proposal could deprive the Department of a substantial amount of funds: the total
value of assets forfeited to the government totaled $536 million
in 1999102 and just over two billion dollars in 2006.103 It is unclear what percentage of those assets would be lost under this
proposal, because there do not seem to be any studies regarding
the amount of restitution that goes unpaid because the defendant
forfeits all available funds.104
Modifying the Rule in the manner proposed would likely
affect the everyday processes of forfeiture and restitution, since
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each party to the system would face altered incentives to claim
or contest the amount of loss. Victims could begin exaggerating their claims of loss, a real possibility given that research
indicates the potential for restitution frequently leads to inflated
claims.105
Conversely, the proposed modifications would create incentives for the government to underestimate loss. Since the
severity of the sentence for the typical property crime is determined largely by the amount of loss suffered,106 government
underestimation of loss would effectively be equivalent to
under-prosecution.
More disturbingly, modifying Rule 32.2 to prioritize restitution over government forfeiture would create incentives for
the government to contest the amount of loss claimed by victims. Absent an affirmative policy from the Department prohibiting litigation against victims, more litigation could be added
to an already crowded federal court docket, cause further stress
to victims, and conflict with the general intent of the CVRA. It
would also be contrary to our scheme of criminal justice—even
absent the CVRA, there is a belief that the role of government
in prosecution is to represent the interests of victims, not to act
against them. The absence of a policy against opposing victims’ claims of restitution would also require modification of
18 U.S.C. 3664(e), which currently provides that
any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of
the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government.107
If the government and the victim contested the amount of loss
before the trial court, the government attorney would be unable
to represent the victim.
Most of the risks described above could be alleviated with
minimal changes to the law and practice of forfeiture. The Department, on its own initiative or as compelled by Congress,
would have to institute a policy of not litigating against victims’
loss claims. That change, together with the remainder of the
proposal detailed above, would ensure that victims’ rights are
no longer subservient to government interests.

V. CONCLUSION
As currently construed, the law of forfeiture conflicts with
the law of restitution. As a result, the government appears to at
least occasionally profit at the expense of crime victims. That
outcome should not be tolerated, since it runs counter to congressional intent, the interests of justice, and the goals and justifications of criminal punishment. Congress should therefore
Spring 2011

modify Rule 32.2 in a way that ensures prioritization of victims’
interests while minimizing deleterious effects on the everyday
practice of forfeiture and restitution.
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